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ABSTRACT
Divergent thinking, the ability to generate multiple ideas from different perspectives, is considered a cen-
tral component of the creative thinking process. While context, personality traits, and cognitive control abil-
ities have individually been shown to have large effects on divergent thinking, their interrelationship is yet
to be elucidated. In 83 healthy participants (Males = 42%), we investigated how context adaptation of diver-
gent thinking is related to normal variations in autistic and positive schizotypal traits as well as to proactive
and reactive cognitive control strategies. Context adaptation of divergent thinking—defined as the variance
in the proportion of unique to total responses of a drawing divergent thinking task performed across four
different contexts—was predicted by a 3-way interaction of autistic traits, positive schizotypal traits, and
cognitive control. Specifically, increasing reactive control improved context adaptation when positive schizo-
typal traits were high and autistic traits were low, while increasing proactive control was associated with
improved context adaptation when both autistic and positive schizotypal traits were high. Both modes of
cognitive control can enhance the ability to generate unique ideas across contexts, but this depends on the
individuals’ specific combinations of autistic and positive schizotypal trait levels.
Keywords: autistic traits, context adaptation, creativity, proactive control, reactive control, schizotypy.
INTRODUCTION
Divergent thinking is typically defined as the ability to generate multiple ideas from different perspectives
(Cropley, 2006; Guilford, 1950; Lubart, Mouchiroud, Tordjman, & Zenasni, 2015), and while it does not
represent creativity per se, it is often perceived as an estimate of the potential for creative problem solving
(Runco & Acar, 2012). Along with convergent thinking—the ability to integrate and evaluate existing infor-
mation and knowledge to arrive at optimal solutions (Guilford, 1950)—it is used in psychological theories
to characterize the creative process (Cropley, 2006; Finke et al., 1992) and is even considered by some as the
essential capacity of the creative process (Robinson, 2011). In this context, divergent thinking has been
viewed both as (a) a malleable ability that is susceptible to context and situational influences (Cropley,
2006; Intasao & Hao, 2018; Runco, 2004; Runco & Pritzker, 1999), and (b) an “endowed trait” underpinned
by a specific personality trait profile (Claridge & McDonald, 2009; Mohr & Claridge, 2015) and cognitive
control abilities (Benedek, Jauk, Sommer, Arendasy, & Neubauer, 2014; Carlsson et al., 2000; Ellamil, Dob-
son, Beeman, & Christoff, 2012; Kowatari et al., 2009). While context, personality traits, and cognitive con-
trol abilities have individually been shown to have large effects on divergent thinking (Ma, 2009; Runco,
2004), their interrelation is yet to be elucidated. This study investigates how personality traits and cognitive
control determine context adaptation of divergent thinking.
Context adaptation of divergent thinking can be defined as the ability to adjust flexibly to conditions or
environments in developing new ideas or products (Cohen, 2012). Research suggests that performance on
divergent thinking or creativity tasks that rely on divergent thinking can be hindered or facilitated,
[Correction added on Jan 11, 2021 after first online publication: the word ‘convergent’ in the title has
been updated to ‘Divergent’.]
The Journal of Creative Behavior, Vol. 0, Iss. 0, pp. 1–17 © 2021 Creative Education Foundation(CEF) DOI: 10.1002/jocb.489 1
depending on the ability of the individual to adapt to a given context or situation (Cropley, 2006; Maddux
& Galinsky, 2009; Runco & Pritzker, 1999). Notably, Cropley (2006) has highlighted that while shifting con-
texts and crossing boundaries are important processes of divergent thinking, considering the particular situa-
tion can minimize the production of absurd associations (e.g., replacing steel reinforcing rods with spaghetti
due to their similarities). Moreover, Dai et al. (2012) have shown that variation in school, home, and neigh-
borhood environments can impact the development of divergent thinking abilities of adolescents. Since the
generation of ideas can be affected when the individual is required to shift from one context to the next,
context adaptation of divergent thinking can thus be seen as an indicator of the individual’s potential to
manifest divergent thinking abilities in novel contexts. If divergent thinking is an estimate of the potential
for creative problem solving (Runco & Acar, 2012), context adaptation of divergent thinking might thus be
a useful index of one’s creative potential across contexts and situations.
Both divergent thinking and context adaptation have been linked to cognitive control—operationalized as
an attentional mechanism involved in the control of information processing (Braver, Paxton, Locke, & Barch,
2009; Groborz & Necka, 2003). With respect to context adaptation, Braver et al. (2009) suggested that context
adaptation could be linked to reactive and proactive modes of cognitive control. According to this Dual Mech-
anisms of Control, proactive control is associated with a tendency to anticipate and maintain a context repre-
sentation in memory to process relevant information, while reactive control is associated with a tendency to
process contextual information instantly without relying on previously constructed contextual cues. It is worth
noting that the Dual Mechanisms of Control model has parallels with the dual process model that has been
discussed in the field of creativity, which proposes that creativity may involve both automatic/flexible and con-
trolled/persistence processes (respectively, reactive and proactive control in terms of the Dual Mechanisms of
Control model) (Beaty, Benedek, Silvia, & Schacter, 2016; Nijstad, Dreu, Rietzschel, & Baas, 2010; Sowden
et al., 2015; Zhang et al., 2020). Since these modes of cognitive control can be flexibly engaged, they can vari-
ably influence how information is processed and used, particularly when adapting to the demands of complex
tasks or contexts (Braver et al., 2009; Braver, 2012; Gonthier, Macnamara, Chow, Conway, & Braver, 2016,
M€aki-Marttunen et al., 2019, Marklund & Persson, 2012). For example, M€aki-Marttunen et al. (2019) showed
that reactive and proactive control strategies were adaptively deployed during the AX-Continuous Perfor-
mance Task that required individuals to update context under different conditions of memory demands.
Furthermore, studies revealed a prominent role for cognitive control in divergent thinking (Benedek et al.,
2014; Groborz & Necka, 2003; Zabelina & Ganis, 2018; Zabelina & Robinson, 2010). For example, divergent
thinking was associated with higher attentional flexibility between frequent global and rare local attentional
levels and vice versa (Zabelina & Ganis, 2018). Moreover, the propensity to perceive meaningful coincidences
has been associated with reduced memory capacity (Rominger et al., 2019), which has been linked to reliance
on reactive control (Gonthier, Zira, Cole, & Blaye, 2019). Therefore, we suggest that cognitive control may be
key in one’s ability to successfully adapt divergent thinking across different contexts. Specifically, we reason
that context adaptation of divergent thinking can be facilitated by calling upon proactive control (by facilitat-
ing context processing in advance through sustained and anticipatory maintenance of goal-relevant informa-
tion), or reactive control (by providing a “fresh” way of looking at context in a stimulus-driven fashion).
The role of personality traits in the creative process, including divergent thinking, has been confirmed in
numerous studies (Ma, 2009) and has largely been investigated in terms of creative personality scales and the
five-factor model of personality (Feist, 2010). A parallel line of research stems from the association of underlying
cognitive styles with certain psychopathologies, such as autism and schizophrenia, and their expression at non-
clinical, personality-variation levels with enhanced creative abilities (Acar, Chen, & Cayirdag, 2018; Fitzgerald &
Lyons, 2013). We focus on autistic and positive schizotypal traits—subthreshold features of autism and
schizophrenia within the neurotypical population—because they have been proposed to play prominent roles in
both divergent thinking (Abu-Akel et al., 2020; Claridge & McDonald, 2009; Crespi, Leach, Dinsdale, Mokko-
nen, & Hurd, 2016; Jung, 2014) and cognitive control-related processes (Abu-Akel, Apperly, Spaniol, Geng, &
Mevorach, 2018; Spaniol, Shalev, & Mevorach, 2018), and because they can co-occur in the same individual
(Abu-Akel, Wood, Hansen, & Apperly, 2015; Sampson et al., 2020; Sierro, Rossier, & Mohr, 2016).
With respect to divergent thinking, positive schizotypal traits have been fairly reliably linked to enhanced
performance on divergent thinking tests. This has been reported by numerous studies showing that individ-
uals with high positive schizotypy, biased for remote associative processing (Mohr & Claridge, 2015), show
significant advantages (both in terms of fluency and originality) on both verbal and figural divergent think-
ing tasks (Abu-Akel et al., 2020; LeBoutillier, Barry, & Westley, 2014; Rominger et al., 2017; O’Reilly, Dun-
bar, & Bentall, 2001; Wang et al., 2017). In contrast, research, although limited, reported both positive and
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negative association of autistic traits with divergent thinking. For example, higher autistic traits have been
shown to have negative association with divergent thinking (in terms of fluency) (Best, Arora, Porter, &
Doherty, 2015; Jankowska, Omelanczuk, Czerwonka, & Karwowski, 2019), but with higher number of
unique responses (Best et al., 2015). Indeed, higher autistic traits might be associated with impaired seman-
tic processing that underlies fluency in the right hemisphere, but with intact left hemisphere, and thus
unimpaired top-down executive processing underlying production of unusual responses (Best et al., 2015).
With respect to cognitive control, research suggests that individuals with elevated positive schizotypal
traits or at-risk state for psychosis are associated with deficits in applying proactive control and appear to
have no major deficit in, and even a bias toward reactive control (Abu-Akel et al., 2018; Niendam et al.,
2014). In the context of creative thinking research, it has been shown that the association of positive schizo-
typy with increased ability of unusual associations—defined as statistically infrequent or “unique” associa-
tions—was not related to proactive interferences, that is, when irrelevant and older information had to be
deleted from memory (Rominger, Weiss, Fink, Schulter, & Papousek, 2011, 2019). Rominger et al. (2017)
also reported that the positive association between positive schizotypy and divergent thinking might coincide
with reduced top-down cognitive control, measured in terms of reduced inhibitory control of auditory
information. In contrast, autistic traits appear to be associated with enhanced performance on tasks requir-
ing proactive control and worse performance in tasks requiring reactive control (Abu-Akel et al., 2018;
Spaniol et al., 2018). For example, Spaniol et al. (2018) have linked the deployment of proactive control to
performance benefits observed in individual with high autistic traits on tasks that required shifting from
local to global contexts as well as from social to nonsocial contexts. We are not aware of studies that investi-
gated the role of cognitive control with respect to the association of autistic traits with divergent thinking.
Our study seems novel in this respect. Taken together, it is intriguing to observe that autistic and positive
schizotypal traits might be associated with contrasting effects both in terms of their association with diver-
gent thinking and their modes of cognitive control (proactive vs. reactive). Accordingly, it is conceivable
that both autistic and positive schizotypal traits may interactively moderate the putative relationship
between cognitive control and context adaptation of divergent thinking.
The current study had two aims: (a) to investigate the association between cognitive control and context
adaptation of divergent thinking and (b) the modulatory role of autistic and positive schizotypal traits of
this association. To do so, we developed a drawing task, adapted from the figural part of the Torrance Test
of Creative Thinking (Torrance, 1974), which assesses divergent thinking across contexts. In our task, partic-
ipants received a basic shape (e.g., a circle) and were asked to draw objects, using this shape, in four differ-
ent contexts (see method for details). For cognitive control, we used the Proactive Behavioural Index (PBI)
of the AX Continuous Performance Task (AX-CPT), where positive scores represent proactive control and
negative scores represent reactive control (Braver, Barch, & Cohen, 1999; Braver et al., 2009).
We surmised above that both proactive control (by facilitating context processing in advance) and reactive
control (by providing a “fresh” way of looking at context) could facilitate the generation of unique ideas across
contexts. Accordingly, we predicted that PBI scores of the AX-CPT task would be associated with context
adaptation of divergent thinking. We further hypothesized that this association would likely be moderated by
the relative levels of autistic and positive schizotypal traits within the individual, given evidence suggesting that
these traits might be associated with contrasting cognitive control strategies and effects on divergent thinking.
Specifically, if autistic and positive schizotypal traits were, respectively, associated with proactive and reactive
control strategy preferences (Abu-Akel et al., 2018; Niendam et al., 2014; Spaniol et al., 2018), it might be con-
ceivable to predict better context adaptation with increasing autistic traits and greater proactive tendencies, as
well as better context adaptation with increasing positive schizotypal traits and greater reactive tendencies.
METHOD
PARTICIPANTS
The sample consisted of 83 neurotypical adults (mean age = 22.37; SD = 2.93; 48 females). The overall
sample size was estimated using an a priori power analysis (G*Power, Version 3.1.9.2; Faul, Erdfelder, Lang,
& Buchner, 2007), with an alpha = 0.05, power = 0.80, and a minimum medium effect size (f2 ≥ 0.15), for
a full factorial regression analysis with three predictors: Autistic traits, positive schizotypal traits and cogni-
tive control (PBI). Students were recruited from three Swiss universities: a polytechnic university (N = 26),
an art and design university (N = 24), and from the school of social sciences of a general university
(N = 33), directly on campus or via an e-mail announcement (for sample characteristics and details see
results section, Table 1). Following Abu-Akel et al. (2020), collecting data from these different universities
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were intended in order to minimize skewed distributions often reported for personality questionnaires when
administered in circumscribed populations (e.g., in psychology students (Hurst, Nelson-Gray, Mitchell, &
Kwapil, 2007) or science students (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 2001)). Partici-
pants self-reported no history of psychiatric illness, epilepsy, neurological disorders, brain injury or alcohol
or substance abuse problems.
AUTISM SPECTRUM QUOTIENT (AQ)
The AQ is a self-report questionnaire used to assess autistic personality traits within the general popula-
tion (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). The AQ consists of 50 items with responses given on 4-point Likert scale
from “Definitely Agree” to “Definitely Disagree.” Each item is scored as 0 or 1, with total scores ranging
from 0 to 50. The AQ consists of five subscales (of 10 items each) representing the 5 dimensions character-
izing the Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD): social skills; attention switching (increased focus of attention);
attention to details; communication; imagination. For the purposes of this study, we only used the AQ total
score. The AQ’s internal consistency in our study was adequate (a = 0.71) and comparable to previously
reported values (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001; Sierro et al., 2016). In the Supplementary Information, we
TABLE 1. Characteristics of Overall Sample and Subgroups









Gender (F/M) 48/35 20/13 10/16 18/6 7.01 .030













































































Note. AQ = Autism Quotient; CAPEp = Positive scale of the Community Assessment of Psychic Experiences;
IQ (fNART) = Intelligence Quotient estimated from the National Adult Reading Test-French version;
PBI = Proactive Behavioral Index (positive values indicate proactive control bias, and negative values indicate
reactive control bias); Context adaptation = Variance in the Proportion of Unique to Total Responses;
Fluency and Unique responses pertain to total responses across all four contexts. a For all continuous vari-
ables, we report means and standard deviations and in parentheses the mean rank of the Kruskal–Wallis test
(H). b All pairwise comparisons of the continuous variables were adjusted by the Bonferroni correction for
multiple tests. AQ total scores were higher for the Science and Tech compared to the Social Sciences students
(pcorr = 0.038), and the CAPE-positive scores were higher for the Arts and Design compared to the Social
Sciences students (pcorr = 0.003). The bold highlight values are significant effects. * p < .05, **p < .01.
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provide descriptive details and internal consistency of the AQ and subscales (Table S1), and the correlations
between the AQ subscales (Table S2).
COMMUNITY ASSESSMENT OF PSYCHIC EXPERIENCES (CAPE-42)
The CAPE consists for 42 self-report items, asking participants to indicate the frequency of their experi-
ences on a 4-point Likert scale from never (1) to nearly always (4). For the purposes of this study, positive
schizotypal personality traits were assessed with the 20-item positive subscale of CAPE-42 (CAPEp) (Kon-
ings, Bak, Hanssen, Van Os, & Krabbendam, 2006). The total score, which can range from 20–80, was calcu-
lated by summing the frequency scores of the 20 items. The internal consistency of CAPEp in our study was
adequate (a = 0.75) and comparable to previously reported values (Brenner et al., 2007). In the Supplemen-
tary Information, we provide descriptive details and internal consistency of the CAPE-42 and subscales
(Table S3), and the correlations between the CAPE-42 subscales (Table S4).
NATIONAL ADULT READING TEST-FRENCH VERSION (FNART)
To control for intelligence which may play a role in divergent thinking (Benedek et al., 2014; Jauk et al.,
2013; Nusbaum & Silvia, 2011), full scale IQ was estimated with the fNART (Mackinnon & Mulligan, 2005).
The fNART consists of 40 words of irregular pronunciation. Participants were awarded one point for every
correctly pronounced word. Using the total score, the full Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS) IQ was
estimated as follows: WAIS-R IQ = 70.33 + 1.41 x fNART (Mackinnon & Mulligan, 2005).
THE AX-CPT NO-GO VERSION
Cognitive control was assessed with a no-go version of the AX-CPT task and administered with PEBL
Version 2.0 Beta 3 program (Mueller & Piper, 2014). Participants were asked to press the spacebar only
when the letter X appeared immediately after an A and to withhold response to all other stimuli. The letter
A represents a relevant cue or context that needs to be maintained in order to treat the target X or the goal
information (Braver et al., 1999). The task also consisted of other letter stimuli, with B representing a ran-
dom cue letter different from A, and Y representing a random probe letter different from X. Following Lee
and Park (2006), the task (see Figure 1) consisted of 10 blocks of 20 letters with a brief break between each
FIGURE 1. Illustration of the computerized AX-CPT task. White letters (cue or probe) are presented on a
black background for 250 ms, with an inter-stimulus interval (ISI) of 1,000 ms. B represents
any cue different from A, and Y any probe different from X. AX trials appeared at a 70%
frequency, and AY, BX, and BY trial types at 10% each.
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block. Participants pressed the space bar to begin the next block. Every stimulus was presented for 250 ms.
The inter-stimulus interval was fixed at 1,000 ms in order to minimize time of cue maintenance, and so
working memory assessment (Lee & Park, 2006). The sequence AX had a probability of 70% and the
remaining sequences (i.e., AY, BX, BY) 10% each. With a high probability of AX occurrences, participants
were expected to develop a heightened tendency to respond to X (Lee & Park, 2006). In this task, AY errors
reflect an excessive maintenance of context, indicative of proactive control, whereas BX errors reflect a lack
of context processing, indicative of reactive control (Barch, Carter, MacDonald, Braver, & Cohen, 2003;
Barch et al., 2004; Braver et al., 1999, 2009; Gonthier et al., 2016). Since we were interested in estimating
reactive and proactive control tendencies, the Proactive Behavioural Index (PBI) (Braver et al., 2009) was
computed as follows: (AY-BX)/(AY + BX). A log-linear correction was applied when errors equaled zero as
follows: (number of errors + 0.5/frequency of trials + 1). A positive PBI score indicated a bias for proactive
control, whereas a negative PBI score indicated a bias for reactive control.
THE DRAWING TASK
A drawing task (see Figure 2) was created to assess non-verbal divergent thinking across contexts. This
task was based on the figural creativity test of Torrance (Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking (TTCT); Tor-
rance, 1974), which required participants to draw objects from lines or circles. We developed a figural test
in order to assess a non-verbal form of idea generation and to be able to use it more widely without lan-
guage barriers. Our drawing task consisted of three basic geometric shapes: a circle, a square, and a triangle.
Each participant was allocated a shape according to a fixed turnover and was asked to draw as many objects
as possible using the allocated shape (i.e., objects containing or having this shape) on an A4 blank sheet. In
contrast to the original TTCT task, in which participants were not restricted to a particular context, in our
task, participants were asked to draw their objects in four different predetermined contexts, which were pre-
sented in a fixed order as follows: school, forest, warehouse, and festival. These contexts correspond to vari-
ous contextual conditions: closed/social (school), open/nonsocial (forest), closed/nonsocial (warehouse), and
open/social (festival) and were chosen to maximize contextual shifts and variation (see section Context vari-
ation of the drawing task of the results section).
Drawing time within each context was limited to three minutes. Participants were instructed to draw as
many objects as they can during three minutes in the given context and that the quality of the drawing was
not important. In addition, participants were asked to number every drawing, and at the end of each draw-
ing period, they were asked to highlight in color the shape in the drawing and to name every object drawn.
This was done in order to ensure that participants understood the instructions and to avoid subjectivity in
object identification. Following naming of objects, participants were asked to immediately move to the fol-
lowing context.
Divergent thinking was assessed under conditions requiring the participant to perform under constraints
imposed by the allocated shape and the given context. As such, the task embodies the necessary conditions
to assess the participants’ potential in the generation of original and unique ideas, within and across con-
texts (Lubart et al., 2015; Nijstad et al., 2010). As recommended by Plucker, Qian, and Wang (2011), the
participant’s creative potential was estimated as the proportion of unique responses to the total responses in
each context, in order to account for the potential confound of fluency. Unique responses were regarded as
those responses that appeared only once in the entire pool of responses produced by the entire study sam-
ple. Shapes that were not transformed into objects were excluded. The first author who ran the experiment
rated the divergent thinking task for the total number of responses and the total number of unique
responses in every context. The intra-class correlation coefficients for the total (ICC = .92) and unique
(ICC = .83) responses across the four contexts suggested that the intrarater reliability was high.
Since we were specifically interested in how well participants performed when shifting to new contexts,
context adaptation of divergent thinking was then conceptualized as the variance in the proportion of
unique to total responses across the four contexts (henceforth, Context Adaptation). Importantly, we
assumed that a lower variance from one context to another would indicate better context adaptation of
divergent thinking. See supplementary information (Tables S5–S7) for a summary of the other task results.
PROCEDURE
In a quiet room, and after a brief explanation of the study, participants signed the consent form and
completed a brief demographics questionnaire. Participants then performed the drawing task and then the
AX-CPT. This was followed by the AQ, fNART, and CAPE-42. All participants performed the task and
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completed the questionnaires in the same order. The entire session lasted about 40 minutes. Participants did
not receive any remuneration for taking part in the study. A written informed consent was obtained from
each participant, and all experiments were conducted in accordance with ethics ordinances of the University
of Lausanne and the Helsinki Declaration. Only French native speakers were enrolled in the study.
FIGURE 2. Sample performance from the drawing task. This figure shows the objects drawn by a
participant with a circle as the basic shape, in the context of a school. The participant
numbered every object while drawing. At the end of the three-minute drawing period, the
participant highlighted in red the shape and named every object, which were noted by the
experimenter. Indicated in black arrows, drawings number 3 (snowman), 8 (hopscotch), and 10
(gymnastics rings) are unique.
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STATISTICAL ANALYSES
First, we performed repeated measures of variance on the proportion of unique to total responses to test
if we were successful in inducing variation across the four contexts of the task. Next, since the distribution
of context adaptation was right skewed (SD = +1.72), we used Spearman’s rho to determine its relationship
with demographic variables and tasks performance measures. Kruskal–Wallis tests were used to examine dif-
ferences between shapes, universities, and sex. We then ran a regression analysis that factorially examined
(i.e., all possible main effects and interactions) the effect of the standardized scores of PBI, autistic, and pos-
itive schizotypal traits on context adaptation. The analysis was conducted using generalized linear models
with a log-link function and robust estimation. The effect size of the regression model was calculated in
terms of Pseudo R2 using the following formula: Pseudo R2 = 1-(Deviance/Null Deviance). Since we were
interested in how autistic and positive schizotypal traits moderated the relationship between PBI and of con-
text adaptation, interaction terms were probed by estimating if the regression slopes of the predictor PBI
were different from zero at different levels of the moderator variables (i.e., at 1 SD, at the Mean, and
at + 1 SD). It is noteworthy that this interaction probe procedure does not involve splitting the sample into
smaller groups using these cutoff points. Rather, it estimates the effect of a predictor on the dependent vari-
able, while holding constant the other predictor at a discrete point. Accordingly, this approach allows us to
infer from the model the effect of discrete levels of autistic and positive schizotypal traits on context adapta-
tion within the entire sample. Where applicable, p-values were adjusted by the Bonferroni correction
method for multiple tests.
RESULTS
SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS
Table 1 reports the characteristics of the overall sample and of the participants of each of the universi-
ties. Differences were observed in gender distribution, AQ total scores, and CAPE-positive scores.
CONTEXT VARIATION OF THE DRAWING TASK
The repeated measures analysis of variance revealed that the proportion of unique to total responses
across the four task contexts (school, forest, warehouse, and festival) was significant (F(3, 246) = 5.53,
p = .001, gp
2 = 0.063), which confirms that our task was successful in inducing considerable response varia-
tion across the four contexts. See Table S7 for the mean and standard deviations of the proportion of
unique responses in the four contexts.
CONTEXT ADAPTATION
First, Spearman’s rho did not reveal any significant association between context adaptation and age, years
of formal education, or IQ (0.180 < rs < .070; ps > .330). Moreover, Kruskal–Wallis tests did not reveal
any significant differences in context adaptation between shapes (H = 5.990, df = 81, p = .050), universities
(H = 1.14, df = 81, p = .57), or sex (H = 0.39, df = 82, p = .53). Considering the absence of significant
results, we did not control for these variables in the regression model. Moreover, Spearman’s rho between
the main variables of the model (Table 2) revealed a positive significant association between autistic and
positive schizotypal traits. There were also significant negative correlations between positive schizotypal traits
and cognitive control (PBI) and between cognitive control and context adaptation, such that increasing
proactive control tendencies were associated with lower positive schizotypal traits and better context adapta-
tion (i.e., lower variance). Moreover, better context adaptation was associated with increased overall (across
all contexts) fluency and unique responses.
Next, the omnibus test of the regression model was significant (v2 = 16.00, df = 7, p = .025, pseudo
R2 = 0.176), explaining 17.6% of the variance. Results of the regression analysis (see Table 3) revealed a sig-
nificant negative interaction of autistic traits and positive schizotypal traits, as well as of autistic traits and
PBI on context adaptation. However, these interactions were qualified by a 3-way interaction of PBI, autistic
traits, and positive schizotypal traits. Therefore, the results are interpreted in terms of this 3-way interaction.
The probe of the 3-way interaction (see Table 4 and Figure 3) revealed that the association of PBI with
context adaptation was significantly positive when autistic traits were relatively low and positive schizotypal
traits were relatively high (Figure 3c, light gray line). In contrast, the association of PBI with context adapta-
tion was significantly negative when both autistic and positive schizotypal traits were relatively high (Fig-
ure 3c, black line).
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EXPLORATORY ANALYSES
In order to further investigate which of the AQ domains were most relevant in the 3-way interaction, we
performed similar analyses for each of the subscales in 5 separate regression models. The results showed that
only the model containing attention switching—where higher scores indicate increased focus of attention—
was significant (v2 = 15.82, df = 7, p = .035, pseudo R2 = .324), explaining 32.4% of the variance (see
Table S8 for complete summary of the regression model). Importantly, parameter estimates revealed that
the 3-way interaction between PBI x Positive Schizotypy 9 Attention Switching was significant (B
(SE) = .125(.059), Wald’s v2 = 4.46, p = .035). The probe of the 3-way interaction (see Figure 4) revealed
that when focus of attention was relatively high the association of PBI with context adaptation was signifi-
cant and progressively more negative with increasing levels of positive schizotypal traits (Figure 4a–c, black
line, Table S9). In contrast, we see that the association of PBI with context adaptation was significantly posi-
tive when focus of attention was relatively low and positive schizotypal traits were relatively high (Figure 4c,
light gray line).
TABLE 3. Summary of Regression Model Examining the Effect of Cognitive Control, Autistic, and Posi-
tive Schizotypal Traits on Context Adaptationa




Autistic traits 0.20 (0.164, 0.143) 0.080 0.07 1 .799
Positive schizotypal traits 0.056 (0.131, 0.225) 0.089 0.40 1 .527
PBI 0.050 (0.534, 0.272) 0.078 0.41 1 .524
Autistic traits x Positive schizotypal traits 0.186 (0.273, 0.068) 0.051 13.13 1 <.001**
PBI x Autistic traits 0.116 (0.609, 0.002) 0.059 3.89 1 .048*
PBI x Positive schizotypal traits 0.114 (0.085, 0.689) 0.075 2.34 1 .126
PBI x Autistic traits x Positive schizotypal
traits
0.191 (0.763, 0.246) 0.050 14.66 1 <.001**
Note. PBI = Proactive Behavioural Index (positive values indicate proactive control bias, and negative values
indicate reactive control bias); *p < .05; **p < .001 a Context adaptation = Variance in the Proportion
of Unique to Total Responses The bold highlight values are significant effects.
TABLE 4. Summary of the Moderating Effects of Autistic and Positive Schizotypal Traits on the Effect
of PBI on Context Adaptation
Level of Moderatorsa B SE t (df = 81) p-value Cohen’s d
Low PS / Low AT 0.011 0.006 1.85 .068 .41
Low PS / Average AT 0.009 0.006 1.52 .133 .34
Low PS / High AT 0.006 0.006 0.96 .340 .21
Average PS / Low AT 0.004 0.006 0.65 .521 .14
Average PS / Average AT 0.003 0.006 0.49 .628 .11
Average PS / High AT 0.010 0.006 1.59 .115 .35
High PS / Low AT 0.029 0.008 3.81 <0.001** .85
High PS / Average AT 0.004 0.006 0.65 .520 .14
High PS / High AT 0.012 0.006 2.04 .045* .45
Note. a PS = Positive Schizotypy; AT = Autistic Traits; Low, average, and high levels of the moderator vari-
ables corresponded to – 1SD from the mean, the mean, and + 1SD from the mean. Effect sizes are reported
in terms of the absolute values of Cohen’s d. The bold highlight values are significant effects. * p < .05;
**p < .001.
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DISCUSSION
The study aimed to investigate (a) the association between cognitive control and context adaptation of
divergent thinking and (b) the modulatory role of autistic and positive schizotypal traits on this association.
We first hypothesized an association between cognitive control and context adaptation of divergent thinking.
This hypothesis was confirmed such that increased proactive control, as indexed by the Proactive Behavioral
Index (PBI) of the AX-CPT task, was associated with better context adaptation, indexed by lower variance
in the proportion of unique to total responses across contexts. This suggests that proactive control is related
FIGURE 3. The moderating effect of autistic and positive schizotypal traits on the association between the
Proactive Behavioural Index (PBI) and Context Adaptation (i.e., Variance in the Proportion of
Unique to Total Responses). Lower variance values indicate better context adaptation of
divergent thinking, and a shift from negative to positive PBI values represents a shift from
reactive to proactive control tendencies. Panel a shows the association of PBI with context
adaptation when positive schizotypal traits are low (LP) and autistic traits are low (LA, light
gray line), average (MA, gray line), and high (HA, black line). Panel b shows the association of
PBI with context adaptation when positive schizotypal traits are average (MP) and autistic traits
are low (LA, light gray line), average (MA, gray line), and high (HA, black line). Panel c shows
the association of PBI with context adaptation when positive schizotypal traits are high (HP)
and autistic traits are low (LA, light gray line), average (MA, gray line), and high (HA, black
line). *p < .05.
FIGURE 4. The moderating effect of attention switching (AS; or increased focus of attention) and positive
schizotypal traits on the association between the Proactive Behavioural Index (PBI) and Context
Adaptation (i.e., Variance in the Proportion of Unique to Total Responses). Lower variance
values indicate better context adaptation of divergent thinking, and a shift from negative to
positive PBI values represents a shift from reactive to proactive control tendencies. Panel a
shows the association of PBI with context adaptation when positive schizotypal traits are low
(LP) and focus of attention is low (LAS, light gray line), average (MAS, gray line), and high
(HAS, black line). Panel b shows the association of PBI with context adaptation when positive
schizotypal traits are average (MP) and focus of attention is low (LAS, light gray line), average
(MAS, gray line), and high (HAS, black line). Panel c shows the association of PBI with context
adaptation when positive schizotypal traits are high (HP) and focus of attention is low (LAS,
light gray line), average (MAS, gray line), and high (HAS, black line). *p < 0.05.
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to the ability to generate unique ideas across contexts and which could reflect the greater ability of individu-
als to maintain focus while working on a creative thinking task (Zabelina & Robinson, 2010). Importantly,
however, the association between context adaptation of divergent thinking and cognitive control, as pre-
dicted by our second hypothesis, was moderated by the relative expression of autistic and positive schizoty-
pal traits. Specifically, the probe of the 3-way interaction of cognitive control, autistic and positive
schizotypal traits revealed that context adaptation improved with (a) increasing reliance on reactive control
when autistic traits were low and positive schizotypal traits were high and (b) with increasing proactive con-
trol and especially when both autistic and positive schizotypal traits were concurrently high. These results
demonstrate that while both cognitive control strategies are conducive to context adaptation of divergent
thinking, the benefit they confer on context adaption appears to depend on the individual’s specific profile
of autistic and positive schizotypal traits.
These results provide insights regarding the effect of the relative expression of autistic and positive
schizotypal traits on the association between cognitive control strategy and the generation of creative diver-
gent ideas across contexts. For the purpose of generating unique divergent ideas across contexts, individuals
with high positive schizotypal traits appear to benefit from a reactive control strategy (see Figure 3c), which
is also evident in the negative association of proactive control and positive schizotypal traits (see Table 2).
Similar to individuals with schizotypal personality disorder (Barch et al., 2004), individuals with high posi-
tive schizotypal traits may exhibit less than optimal capacity in constructing and maintaining context repre-
sentation. This implies that representation of contextually relevant information may only be encoded
temporarily. Thus, reactive control may enable them to cope with this deficit by processing information
without maintaining context representation, but which is reactivated with newly presented information or
contexts. This dovetails with evidence linking reactive control to diminished working memory capacity
(Gonthier et al., 2019), which has also been found to be associated with positive schizotypy (Matheson &
Langdon, 2008; Schmidt-Hansen & Honey, 2009). We can, therefore, think of reactive control as an adaptive
strategy for individuals with high positive schizotypal traits that enables them to manifest their creative
potential in various contexts.
However, it is important to also note, as is also evident from Figures 3c and 4c, that a shift from reactive
to proactive control strategy greatly diminishes the ability of individuals with high positive schizotypal traits
to flexibly generate unique ideas across contexts. This is consistent with research in patients with schizophre-
nia (Boudewyn, Scangos, Ranganath, & Carter, 2020; Lesh et al., 2013) and neurotypicals with high positive
schizotypal traits (Abu-Akel et al., 2018) who exhibited a decline in performance in tasks requiring proactive
compared to reactive control. The notion of latent inhibition—the inability to filter out previously experi-
enced events or contexts as irrelevant—which is considered an endophenotype of schizotypy (Lubow &
Gewirtz, 1995) and specifically positive schizotypy (Schmidt-Hansen et al., 2009), might help explain the
uneven performance of these individuals across contexts when deploying a proactive control strategy. Thus,
it is conceivable that the retention of information from the previous context, which is now irrelevant for the
new context, might interfere with performance in the new context. Taken together, this suggests that creativ-
ity tasks that induce or are inherently biased toward proactive control may put individuals with high posi-
tive schizotypal traits at a disadvantage, particularly when shifting contexts is required.
Our main analysis also revealed that proactive control can facilitate context adaptation in people who
are also high on both autistic and positive schizotypal traits, such that when positive schizotypal traits are
high, proactive control improved context adaptation with increasing autistic traits (see Figure 3c). However,
the exploratory analyses revealed that the role of autistic traits in explaining the relationship between context
adaptation and cognitive control is more nuanced and appears specific to the attention-switching domain,
suggesting that proactive control is associated with better context adaption in individuals with high focus of
attention (see Figure 4a), and which was further enhanced in those with increasing levels of positive schizo-
typal traits (Figure 4a–c), as evident by the increase in effect sizes (see Table S9). This is consistent with the
suggestion that increased focus of attention affords the individual the ability to optimize the deployment of
proactive control by minimizing interference from internal or external sources of distraction (Braver, 2012).
Notably, these results also suggest that unlike reactive control, which appears to facilitate context adaptation
in individuals with high positive schizotypy and low focus of attention (Figure 4c), proactive control facili-
tates context adaptation in individuals with low positive schizotypy and high focus of attention (Figure 4a).
This is consistent with previous research suggesting that individuals with contrasting autistic and positive
schizotypy trait profiles appear to be differentially reliant on proactive versus reactive control strategies
(Abu-Akel et al., 2018; Niendam et al., 2014; Spaniol et al., 2018).
12
Context Adaptation of Divergent Thinking
Taken together, the above findings suggests that both reactive and proactive control can facilitate context
adaptation, albeit by activating different mechanisms. As stated above, proactive control facilitates context
adaptation by monitoring the context and maintaining task relevant information over a sustained period of
time, while reactive control facilitates context adaptation by processing current contextual information and
without relying on previously constructed contextual cues. While different, we contend that both strategies
converge on minimizing interference with the successful completion of the goal, which is one reason why
both cognitive control strategies are conducive to context adaptation. Under proactive control, interference
is minimized by focus of attention, which substantially reduces the availability of externally distracting infor-
mation or irrelevant information that could be held in working memory. In contrast, under reactive control,
interference is minimized by inhibiting previously held representations from interfering with newly con-
strued goals or contexts. It has been suggested that the use of reactive and proactive control might be related
to working memory capacity (Gonthier et al., 2019). It would be interesting to know in future studies how
interference reduction might interact with working memory capacity in facilitating context adaption.
Moreover, the finding regarding improved context adaptation in people who are high on both autistic
and positive schizotypal traits (see Figures 3c and 4c) is consistent with previous research showing that
autistic and positive schizotypal traits interactively improved perspective-taking abilities (Abu-Akel et al.,
2015), social and executive functioning (Shi et al., 2017), and reduced interference from salient distractors
(Abu-Akel, Apperly, Wood, Hansen, & Mevorach, 2017). Thus, it may not be serendipitous that the combi-
nation of such phenotypes (i.e., co-occurring autism and psychosis) has been proposed to explain the genius
of Beethoven, Newton, and Nash (Badcock, 2009). But how does the concurrent presence of high autistic
and high positive schizotypal traits render proactive control more beneficial to context adaptation? It can be
speculated that the co-presence of these traits make possible for the individual to tap both systematic and
flexible processing modes within and across contexts (see Nijstad et al., 2010), which are, respectively,
afforded by proactive and reactive control (Appelbaum, Boehler, Davis, Won, & Woldorff, 2014). Since the
correlation analyses in our study showed only support for the association between positive schizotypal traits
and reactive control tendencies, the contribution of increasing autistic traits to improvement in context
adaptation under proactive control remains unresolved. However, if individuals with high schizotypal traits
are similar to patients with schizophrenia in that they can engage reactive but not proactive control mecha-
nisms (Lesh et al., 2013), the co-presence of autistic traits, which has been associated with greater utilization
of proactive control strategies (Spaniol et al., 2018), appears to somehow restore the ability for these indi-
viduals to flexibly engage proactive control. It should be noted, however, that while healthy participants are
expected to flexibly engage these modes of cognitive control (Marklund & Persson, 2012), our results sug-
gest that this might be maximally present among individuals in whom both high levels of autistic and posi-
tive trait dimensions are co-present.
Our results may have implications to theories of creativity. While these theories are in agreement that
both automatic and effortful/controlled processes are both involved in the creative process (Beaty et al.,
2016; Nijstad et al., 2010; Sowden et al., 2015; Zabelina & Robinson, 2010; Zhang et al., 2020), they remain
uncertain as to the relative contribution (or utilization) of these processes. Our results support the relevance
of both automatic (reactive) and controlled (proactive) processes for context adaptation of divergent think-
ing, but also provide novel insight suggesting that the engagement of these processes depend on the relative
combination of autistic and positive schizotypal traits within the individual.
Our findings should be considered in light of a number of limitations. First, the sample consisted of stu-
dents only and thus may not be representative of the general population. However, by sampling from differ-
ent universities and fields of study, in which certain traits are clearly more represented (see Table 1), the
distribution of these traits in our overall sample might approximate their distribution within the general
population (see Sampson et al., 2020). Second, the results of the context adaptation task may be limited by
the instructions, which did not explicitly ask participants to draw creative objects, but to draw as many
objects as possible. Such explicit instructions have been shown to enhance participants’ tendency to generate
creative ideas (Nusbaum, Silvia, & Beaty, 2014). Third, while our task has not been previously validated, the
results show that the task is sensitive to subtle variation in personality traits and cognitive control and, thus,
is potentially a useful new tool for research concerned with the role of context adaptation in creativity.
Fourth, these results may be limited by the single rater assessment of the task; however, our criteria for
ascertaining fluency (total number of responses) and identifying the unique responses were considered
straightforward enough not to require more than one rater, which is also evident by the high intrarater reli-
ability. Fifth, while the task has the advantage of not relying on language abilities, the results may not be
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generalizable to all test environments. Future research may explore our operationalization of context adapta-
tion using other figural and language-based divergent/creative thinking tests. Sixth, a replication of our
research would be enhanced by the inclusion of a measure of working memory capacity, since it has been
associated with reactive control (Gonthier et al., 2019), positive schizotypy (Matheson & Langdon, 2008;
Schmidt-Hansen & Honey, 2009), and creative thinking (Rominger et al., 2011, 2019). Finally, our study has
examined how divergent thinking fluctuates with change in context. However, creativity involves both con-
vergent and divergent thinking (Cropley, 2006; Guilford, 1950), which have respectively been associated with
autistic and positive schizotypal tendencies (Abu-Akel et al., 2020; Claridge & McDonald, 2009; Webb, Little,
Cropper, & Roze, 2017). Assessing the interaction between cognitive control, autistic, and positive schizoty-
pal traits on how convergent thinking fluctuates with change in context would be an important next step.
CONCLUSION
To our knowledge, this study is the first to investigate the interplay between cognitive control, autistic,
and positive schizotypal traits on the ability to produce divergent ideas across contexts. Our results suggest
that both reactive and proactive cognitive control mechanisms can facilitate context adaptation of divergent
thinking. However, we show that this depends on the specific combination of autistic and positive schizoty-
pal traits within the individual, with reactive control benefiting those with a predominant-positive schizoty-
pal profile, and proactive control predominantly benefiting those who are high on both autistic and positive
schizotypal traits. To the extent divergent thinking is an estimate of one’s creative potential (Runco & Acar,
2012), this suggests that creative individuals, endowed with specific personality trait profiles, can deploy
their cognitive control system in a context-sensitive manner (see also Zabelina & Robinson, 2010). To make
further progress in understanding variability in the human creative thinking process, it will be necessary to
measure the impact of inducing different cognitive control strategies in individuals with various autistic and
positive schizotypal phenotypic combinations. This would contribute to answering one of Guilford’s (1950)
long-standing questions: How can we promote the development of creative personalities? The present study
highlights the utility and potential of such an approach.
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